A Theory of Entangled Political Economy, with Application to TARP and NRA by Smith, Adam
Johnson & Wales University
ScholarsArchive@JWU
Economics Department Faculty Publications &
Research College of Arts & Sciences
2011
A Theory of Entangled Political Economy, with
Application to TARP and NRA
Adam Smith
Johnson & Wales University - Charlotte, adam.smith@jwu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.jwu.edu/econ_fac
Part of the Other Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at ScholarsArchive@JWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Faculty Publications & Research by an authorized administrator of ScholarsArchive@JWU. For more information, please
contact jcastel@jwu.edu.
Repository Citation
Smith, Adam, "A Theory of Entangled Political Economy, with Application to TARP and NRA" (2011). Economics Department Faculty
Publications & Research. 3.
https://scholarsarchive.jwu.edu/econ_fac/3
A Theory of Entangled Political Economy, with Application to TARP 
and NRA 
 
 
Adam Smith*, Richard E. Wagner*, and Bruce Yandle** 
 
*George Mason University 
 
**Clemson University and George Mason University’s Mercatus Center 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
  
 
The recent financial crisis has provoked a raft of contending claims as to whether the 
cause of the crisis is better attributed to market failure or political failure.  Such claims 
are predicated on a presumption that markets and polities are meaningfully separate 
entities.  To the contrary, we argue that contemporary arrangements create an 
entangled political economy that renders theorizing based on separation often 
misleading.  Within this alternative framework of entangled political economy, we 
illuminate both the recent Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) and the New Deal’s 
National Recovery Administration (NRA).    
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1.  Introduction 
 The recent disturbances within financial markets, along with the accompanying 
recession, have caused reverberations within academic circles as well as throughout 
the economies of the world.  Within academic circles, a clear polarity has appeared 
concerning the locus of blame.  On one side of that polarity stand claims that the crisis 
is an instance of market failure, which demonstrates the need for stronger regulatory 
control over markets, as illustrated by Cohan (2009), Posner (2009), and Shiller (2008).  
On the other side stand claims that the crisis is a manifestation of excessive regulation, 
the remedy for which is less regulation, as illustrated by Sowell (2009), Taylor (2009), 
White (2008), and Woods (2009).  
 We do not seek here to adjudicate these contending claims, at least not in any 
direct fashion, because our object of analytical interest is the theory of political economy 
and not macro-level instability per se.1  Our concern here is with the conceptual 
treatment of systems of political economy, using some macro-level material associated 
with economic disturbance to provide substantive content.  “Political economy” is a 
compound term formed from the elements polity and economy, each of which in turn 
can be conceptualized as pure forms.  The question at hand is how to combine those 
pure forms to arrive at political economy.  The common way is to do so through 
sequential addition, as conveyed crisply in Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley 
(2006).  Within this framework, market equilibrium is established theoretically prior to 
                                            
1 We would demur, however, from the numerous remarks that have claimed that the recent events have 
shown the inadequacy of all macro-level theories. They have shown the inadequacy of theories of the 
income-expenditure variety where present actions produce current results. But Austrian-style theories, 
where credit expansion today can cause a boom tomorrow while also causing a bust the day after 
tomorrow have been generally on the mark. While much work remains to be done in developing this line 
of explanation, as Wagner (1999) explores, it does explain how credit expansion can produce a sequence 
of boom-and-bust.  
 3
and independently of political action, with subsequent political intervention establishing 
an alternative equilibrium.  This sequential and separable framework is, of course, used 
to divergent effect: where some claim that political intervention promotes Pareto 
efficiency or something close to it, others claim that it generates significant losses 
associated with rent seeking (Tullock 1967) and rent extraction (McChesney 1997).  
 The separated framework leads naturally to efforts to locate the source of 
disturbance as originating in either polity or economy.  For instance, Congleton (2009) 
attributes the recent disturbance largely to market processes; alternatively, Rowley and 
Smith (2009) conclude that causation resides with political action.  In contrast, our 
framework of entangled and simultaneous political economy, as sketched in Wagner 
(2006, 2007), highlights a third possible option: the recent disturbance is a systemic 
feature of a constitutional system of entangled political economy.2  We start by setting 
forth our framework of entangled political economy and compare it with separated 
political economy.  After doing this we examine two historical episodes to illustrate the 
explanatory ability of the entangled framework.  The first of those episodes is the recent 
development of the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP); the second is the National 
Recovery Administration (NRA) of the New Deal.  
 
2. Two conceptualizations of political economy 
 Any analytical framework unavoidably highlights some phenomena while ignoring 
other phenomena.  Within the framework of separated political economy, the final 
societal equilibrium is generated by sequential addition over two distinct institutional 
                                            
2 In this vein, we would note that Oliver Kessler (2009) likewise advances a systemic line of explanation, 
though from an analytic orientation grounded in economic sociology.   
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frameworks: a market framework governed by private property and freedom of contract 
and a constitutional framework that governs political transactions.  Actions taken in the 
political arena thus modify the equilibrium established within the market arena.  A 
further significant feature of this framework is that polity and economy are each 
conceptualized as single, point-mass entities that act upon one another.  
 Figure 1 illustrates this analytical framework.  The polity is denoted by the 
octagon, the economy by the square.  As shown there, the polity acts as a single 
massed entity on the economy which responds as a single massed entity by shifting 
from E to E* due to political action on the economy, much as one billiard ball would act 
upon another.  Separated political economy theorizes by a process of layered addition.  
The theory proceeds smoothly and sequentially, with economic entities acting first and 
political entities second.  The outcome of this model of political economy corresponds to 
what we observe after the second move.   
 The alternative framework of entangled political economy differs in several 
significant respects from that of separated political economy.  For one thing, polity and 
economy are not conceptualized through reduction to point-mass status.  There is, after 
all, nothing about billiard balls that would allow entanglement.  For entanglement to be 
possible, the entities must be conceptualized as networks of relationships where 
individual nodes craft particular connections with other nodes, and with those 
connections running through both are arenas of action.  Furthermore, market and 
political actions are undertaken simultaneously, and within an institutional framework 
that is open to all actors in both arenas.  Polity and economy are both arenas of activity 
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that contain numerous interacting enterprises that are connected in network fashion 
whose systemic properties depend on the structure of the network.  
 Figure 2 illustrates in simplified fashion a framework of entangled political 
economy.  The figure is simplified because the individual entities in the economy are 
portrayed as stand-alone entities and not as existing within a network, so as to reduce 
the clutter of connections among economic entities that would otherwise appear.  The 
main feature of interest in Figure 2 is that neither polity nor market is reducible to point-
mass status.  Individual political enterprises differ in the economic entities on which they 
act, and with different locations of political action generating different economic 
consequences due to different patterns of network connection among economic entities 
(which have been suppressed in Figure 2).  
 While competition among and across commercial and political entities is a key 
characteristic of the entangled political economy, specialized and divided knowledge is 
a central feature of this process (Hayek 1945).  Smith and Yandle (2009) explain how 
this divided knowledge generates global patterns that never were the direct object of 
any participant’s choice, but rather were emergent properties of systemic interaction.  
As agreements are reached, statutes modified, and regulations written, a package of 
outcomes emerges that no one has chosen, not even senior members of the legislative 
and executive branches of government.  Each participant pursues opportunities for gain 
within a networked system of complex interaction where the overall outcome is not a 
product of intentional choice.  
 This formulation of entangled political economy is not new, though the 
reductionist-driven imperative of tractable modeling has relegated it to the background 
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of theoretical inquiry.  For instance, Jonathan Hughes (1977) presents a wide-ranging 
account of entangled political economy going back to colonial times in America, where 
polity and economy evolved simultaneously through entangled interaction (Yandle, 
1984).  On a conceptual level, Jane Jacobs (1992) describes societal processes that 
evolve through interaction between institutional carriers of two distinct moralities, which 
she describes as the commercial and the guardian moral syndromes.  A central feature 
of her analysis is the treatment of some of the debilitating qualities of certain patterns of 
entanglement, and which she describes as “monstrous moral hybrids,” and which to 
some extent is reflected in Jonah Goldberg’s (2008) treatment of Liberal Fascism and 
also in Bruce Yandle’s (1983) treatment of Baptists and bootleggers.  Indeed, 
entanglement-driven regulation that delivers special benefits for one part or sector of the 
political economy while imposing costs another is recognized as far back as Magna 
Charta (Yandle 1984) and as recently as the 2010 debate over cap-and-trade carbon 
emission regulation (Yandle, 2010b).  In those two cases and with entanglement 
generally, political connections and social structure, long developed between interest 
groups and political power brokers, become energized and highly visible when some 
political or economic shock sets the stage for action.  At other times, lobbyists and 
politicians, whose political survival depends on serving and balancing the demands of 
multiple competing interests, happily maintain the connecting networks.  
 Our analytical framework has both similarities to and differences with Sanford 
Ikeda’s (1997) and Steve Littlechild’s (1997) treatments of the dynamics of 
interventionism.  The similarities reside in a common concern with the systemic 
properties of interaction between economic and political entities, and with entanglement 
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in both cases being a continuing process.  The differences reside in our use of a 
network-based formulation in contrast to the field-based formulation of Ikeda and 
Littlechild.  As Jason Potts (2000) explains, network-based formulations are more 
suitable for exploring patterns of continual evolution where the emphasis is placed on 
particular patterns of entanglement and not on the general presence of entanglement.  
Thus our formulation extends the earlier formulations by supplying some gain-seeking 
logic by which particular patterns of entanglement are generated.  
 With regard to institutional arrangements, Elinor Ostrom (1986) reminds us that it 
is not sufficient to describe the political process as exogenous if we hope to understand 
outcomes as they emerge in naturally occurring environments.  It is necessary to go 
further by undertaking an examination of the actual organization of decision-making in 
particular institutional contexts, because different particular contexts can yield different 
patterns of outcome, as Ostrom (2005) explains.  Only in this way will we be able to 
understand why certain outcomes emerge rather than others.  Ostrom’s theme informs 
our own effort to work with a theory of entangled political economy because we think 
that this institutional framework more accurately reflects the institutional framework from 
which the present situation has emerged.  
 
 
3. Entangled political economy and the triadic architecture of exchange 
 Within the pure theory of a market economy, a transaction entails a dyadic 
relationship between buyer and seller, and with the terms of trade reflecting agreement 
between them.  Those transactions can be aggregated and then reasonably reduced to 
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a representative transaction without losing economically significant information.  A credit 
transaction within the pure theory of a market economy would involve a relationship 
between borrower and lender and no one else.  In choosing among borrowers, lenders 
would base decisions on their appraisal of the anticipated commercial value of proposed 
transactions, as this value is governed within the framework of private property and 
freedom of contract.  A borrower whose offer is rejected by a lender can try other 
lenders, but transactions between borrowers and lenders are dyadic relationships in any 
case.  
 Political action can be introduced into such transactions in two distinct ways, as 
Walter Eucken (1952) explains in his distinction between political actions that are 
market-conformable and those that are not.  While it may be doubtful that market 
conformability is a dichotomous state as against denoting some continuum, the 
distinction between conformable and non-conformable actions still has traction in 
distinguishing separated from entangled political economy.3  Should political actions 
conform to the operating features of the market economy, the outcome could be 
described as an instance of separated political economy.  Political action would affect all 
credit transactions in non-discriminatory fashion, in which case it would still be 
reasonable to reduce the aggregate of credit transactions to a representative 
transaction.  Figure 1 denotes a situation where political actions are market conformable 
in that they act upon the market as an entity and are neutral toward the pattern of 
activities within the market.  Within a framework of separated political economy, political 
                                            
3 In similar fashion, neutral taxation surely depicts a continuum and not a dichotomy. The alleged 
neutrality of a head tax assumes wrongly that heads can be counted accurately independently of the size 
of the tax. A head tax may be comparatively neutral among contemporary tax instruments, but the 
enumerated size of a population would surely vary inversely with the size of the tax. 
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action tweaks market outcomes without modifying the modus operandi of the market 
process.  Market transactions would retain their dyadic quality, with a polity entity 
offering bounties to market-based entities but without getting involved in the operation of 
those entities. 
 In contrast, political actions that are non-conformable with market processes 
generate an entangled political economy, one illustration of which is presented in Figure 
2.  Within this alternative framework, transactions are triadic as political entities 
participate in market transactions.  It is no longer reasonable to reduce some market 
aggregate to a representative transaction because the behavior of that aggregate will 
vary with the particular network structure from which the aggregate emerges; such 
networks are scale-free, so there is no scale by which an aggregate can be reduced to 
a representative transaction (Barabási 2002).  Transactions occur between particular 
entities within the market and the polity and not between market and polity as point-
mass entities.  The triadic quality of transactions, moreover, shifts the character of 
commercial calculation. In dyadic exchanges between market entities, both parties 
share a common focal point due to their residual claimant positions.  This focal point, for 
instance, explains why the preponderance of commercial disputes is settled without 
trial.  With the triadic transactions of entangled political economy, the salience of the 
common focal point weakens due to the absence of residual claimancy within political 
entities.  
 With dyadic transactions, a lender calculates by ordering borrowers in terms of 
potential profitability when that profitability depends only on the forecasted repayment 
activity of the borrower.  With triadic transactions, this simple calculus gives way to a 
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more complex calculus that is not readily reducible to a scalar magnitude, due to the 
absence of residual claimancy.  Transactions cannot be ordered by their reduction to 
scalar magnitudes because they retain vector qualities.  For instance, transactions 
might be subject to side constraints that reflect perceived regulatory preferences 
regarding the distribution of loans by age, race, gender, or location, to select four 
categories commonly in play.  Regulatory monitoring, however, is never subject to open 
calculation but rather invariably involves significant measures of arbitrariness that 
impedes economic calculation as compared with dyadic exchange.  
 Profit takes a different form when pursued by political entities than when pursued 
by market entities.  There is, however, no unique form that pursuit takes, which injects 
further complication into economic calculation.  Figure 3 illustrates this point. Political 
entities are organized within a framework of inalienable ownership, in contrast to market 
entities.  Hence, profit cannot be appropriated directly through political entities.  Yet 
profit is always present because it merely signifies mutual gains for the parties to a 
transaction.  Hence, a nonprofit status does not eliminate the search for profit but only 
changes the paths taken by that search.  Panel A illustrates an exchange between two 
market entities denoted by the squares, and with each party expecting to profit from the 
trade as denoted by the arrows running to the small circles outside the squares.  Panel 
B illustrates a similar exchange when one party is a political entity.  While both sides 
expect to profit, political profit cannot be appropriated directly, and yet the anticipation of 
profit will be there or else the enterprise would not have been sponsored.  The small 
triangle located between and to the right of the political and market entities indicates 
that profit is channeled in some indirect fashion, as illustrated by the cloud into which 
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that profit flows.  The image of the cloud is meant to cover the variety of particular ways 
that such profit might be appropriated: it could be appropriated though higher prices 
paid to particular input suppliers; it could also be appropriated by offering lower prices to 
favored buyers.  Regardless of the form of appropriation, entangled political economy 
will feature the appropriation of profits through triadic exchange relationships.  
 Entangled political economy theorizes in terms of universal profit-seeking 
pursued simultaneously in both arenas.  While political entities cannot appropriate profit 
directly from their activities, successful political action will nonetheless create profits to 
be appropriated, for profit is just another word for gain.  What we have is universal 
competition as a feature of universal scarcity, only with the enterprises that engage in 
competitive activity doing so under different institutional rules of property rights, creating 
settings of cooperation-cum-conflict that we denote as entangled political economy.  
 With respect to Panel B of Figure 3, some political entities may be characterized 
as Big Players (Koppl and Yeager 1996; Koppl 2002).  We should note that a Big Player 
is not distinguished by size but by a mode of operation that differs from that of ordinary 
market participants.  The presence or absence of residual claimancy is one such 
distinguishing difference.  Transactions between people who are working with their own 
capital may play out differently than transactions where one participant is working with 
inalienable capital.  Commercial firms have strong incentive to settle disputes because 
they are working with alienable capital. If one party to a dispute is a political entity, say 
an Attorney General, the dispute may play out differently.  For one thing, the Attorney 
General cannot claim any residual for settling the dispute.  Even more, continuation of 
the dispute might generate valued publicity for an attempt at higher office.  In any case, 
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the Attorney General would generally not operate according to the same language of 
economic calculation as ordinary market participants.  
 Credit markets provide particularly good material for the operation of entangled 
political economy in light of the presence of Big Players.  A credit transaction is a form 
of rental contract where a lender hands over temporary possession of an asset to a 
borrower.  Rental contracts create opportunities for asset conversion that are not 
present with sales contracts, and so different institutional arrangements have grown up 
around rental contracts.  The conversion of dyadic transactions into triadic transactions 
through the entrance of Big Players would seem to provide particularly fruitful analytical 
opportunities, which could not be so readily addressed within a framework of separated 
political economy.  Most of those opportunities relate to changes inside orthodox 
aggregates rather than to aggregates themselves, with resulting changes in aggregates 
reflecting systemic properties of an entangled political economy, as we shall now 
explore in some detail for two specific cases. 
 
4. Current episode:  The TARP as illuminated by entangled political economy 
 We draw upon two episodes of crisis to better illuminate the relevance of our 
theory of entangled political economy.  Though we maintain that entanglement is a 
relevant organizing framework during all periods of politico-economic activity, we argue 
that moments of crisis are particularly useful in demonstrating this relevance because 
crisis accelerates interaction between the two orders as demand for political responses 
increases in the wake of undesirable macro-outcomes (see Higgs 1987).  
Consequently, new relationships are formed across nodes as traditional boundaries are 
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less respected.  Finally, this entanglement occurs with greater transparency both 
because of the previous two arguments and because participants in the entanglement 
process are more likely to favor expediency over palatability. 
 To demonstrate how entanglement theory illuminates actions taken in a highly 
energized political economy, we must 1) explain how an entangled field for action is first 
formed by key political economy players, 2) identify the energized linkages that brighten 
during stressful times to deliver specialized benefits to emerging Big Players and related 
economic agents in the political economy, and then 3) show how an entanglement 
contagion develops that embraces other firms and industries in an inspired regulatory 
process.  Along the way, we must describe the “gears in the transmission” that make 
the transfer mechanism work for key players.  Our entanglement story offers a superior 
explanation to events relative to other theories of regulation such as public interest, 
capture, or special interest theory.4   
 In applying our theory, we first draw on the events that led to the creation of the 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). We must call attention to the 2007-2008 
international financial collapse and world recession that preceded TARP. What followed 
in the United States was the most serious economic recession since World War II.  We 
note that the credit collapse was associated with an unusual 2001-2005 expansion of 
credit for adjustable rate mortgage lending to less qualified borrowers and to investors 
(Taylor 2009: 1-10).  As described by Yandle (2010a) and others, the credit collapse 
has no single cause that might be attributed to one overriding component or agent of 
the political economy but is rather the result of interacting necessary (but not sufficient) 
                                            
4 A summary and discussion of various regulation theories is found in Morriss, Yandle, and Dorchak 
(2009: 1-15). 
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conditions instigated by rent-seeking interest groups that together had formed a 
economically vulnerable political/social structure which ultimately collapsed.  Included in 
the structure were long-established linkages that delivered benefits from an entangled 
set of political agents, central bankers and regulatory agencies to mortgage bankers 
and lenders, credit rating agencies, accounting rule makers, insurance companies, and 
international broker/dealers.  This was at a time when interest rates were low and the 
U.S. government was dedicated to expanding home ownership among lower income 
citizens (Sowell 2009: 30-50; Wallin 2008; Yandle 2010a).  Enlarged use of the 
securitization and sale of mortgage–related debt instruments by major Wall Street 
bankers further accommodated the expanded lending.  Mortgage-backed bonds found 
their way into the portfolios of financial and other institutions worldwide.  The 
subsequent financial collapse became known as the sub-prime crisis, referring to a 
category of mortgages held as assets by major financial institutions.  The magnitude 
and scope of ownership of these assets was so large and their value so questionable 
that banks, financial institutions and even governments worldwide found themselves 
teetering at the margin of bankruptcy.  It was in the throes of this crisis that the 
connecting political economy linkages became highly energized and U.S. government 
officials supported a series of unprecedented actions.  We draw on three episodes in 
the evolution of the TARP demonstrating the consequences of these newly energized 
entanglement network of relationships that connected political and market enterprises.   
 
4.1: Key events in the crisis and the thickening of entanglement 
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 Our first episode covers the emergence of the TARP in response to the financial 
crisis. We note that at the time when TARP emerged, the linkages between politicians, 
central banker, regulators, private bankers and insurance companies were well 
established and functioning.  Robert Higgs (1987) explains how the arrival of a crisis 
provides opportunities for profit the exploitation of which thickens and energizes the 
extent of entanglement.  The resulting stronger linkages and thickened entanglement 
are pertinacious and consequently remain in place after the crisis has passed (see 
Tullock 1975). 
 As described by the conventional wisdom of monetary economics, the traditional 
means of combating recessionary pressures and liquidity constraints is through the 
Federal Reserve.  The Fed is endowed with a variety of tools to deal with perceived 
crises in the economy.  Monetary policy actions taken by the Fed operate primarily 
through managing the money supply and influencing the federal funds rate, which is the 
interest rate charged in markets for overnight interbank borrowing.  These powers 
granted to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) with regard to insolvent 
financial institutions theoretically enable bank regulators to stabilize the economy very 
much along the lines of a separated perspective.   
During the initial stages of the reaction to the credit crisis, these organizations 
largely followed previously established guidelines for dealing with trouble in financial 
markets.  For example, the federal funds rate set by the Federal Reserve averaged 
1.81% in September 2008.  This rate had fallen to 0.15% as of September 2009.  The 
Federal Reserve took these measures apparently in hope of expanding the credit 
market in light of the collapse of two government sponsored mortgage lenders, Freddie 
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Mac and Fannie Mae, which molded the vast majority of the market for home loans 
made in the United States.  Additionally, the FDIC later increased its deposit coverage 
insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 (see below).5   
 The reduction of the federal funds rate and primary credit responses by the FDIC 
to assist troubled financial institutions are traditional responses in times of crisis.  The 
TARP, on the other hand, initially was justified as being critically necessary to remove 
bad debt from the banking system and “restart” the mortgage market.  TARP would 
augment the use of the Federal Reserve’s traditional tools in reducing the credit market 
crisis.   
Working together in a rare burst of cooperation, U.S. Secretary of Treasury 
Henry Paulson and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke searched the limits 
of their statutory powers and beyond for ways to inject credit directly into the balance 
sheets of the teetering banking community.  There were a number of mechanisms 
considered, including providing cash by taking an equity ownership in the failing firms.  
However, a plan replaced this option that went directly to the problem, the deeply 
depressed mortgage-backed securities held by banks.  Using the TARP, the Treasury 
would purchase these so-called toxic assets, hold them, and later sell them off, it was 
hoped, at a higher price than paid for them.  In effect, the Fed was to become a hedge 
fund manager.  But, of course, taking the action required congressional approval.  The 
direct interaction of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Board, and Congress that 
followed ended at least temporarily but perhaps permanently the much-celebrated 
independent position held by the U.S. central bank since the end of World War II.  
 In remarks before Congress, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson claimed: 
                                            
5 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08093.html 
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We have proposed a program to remove troubled assets from the system. This 
troubled asset relief program has to be properly designed for immediate 
implementation and be sufficiently large to have maximum impact and restore 
market confidence. It must also protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent 
possible, and include provisions that ensure transparency and oversight while 
also ensuring the program can be implemented quickly and run effectively...  
 
…Over these past days, it has become clear that there is bipartisan consensus 
for an urgent legislative solution. We need to build upon this spirit to enact this 
bill quickly and cleanly, and avoid slowing it down with other provisions that are 
unrelated or don't have broad support. This troubled asset purchase program on 
its own is the single most effective thing we can do to help homeowners, the 
American people and stimulate our economy.6 
 
This initiative was first met with skepticism; on its first run through Congress, the statute 
failed to pass.  A second attempt, however, which included certain unrelated provisions 
that may be thought of as side-payments, was successful and signed into law on 
October 3, 2008 as The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.  The Act was 
summarized as an effort “to provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase 
and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and 
preventing disruption in the economy and financial system…”7  In effect, the Act gave 
Mr. Paulson an open hunting license to do almost anything to soften the crisis, and 
without required accountability to Congress or transparency of action so that taxpayers 
would be able to know who was being favored and who was not. 
 TARP represented a shift in the underlying constitutional order of how political 
enterprises relate to market enterprises with respect to financial intermediation, property 
rights, and the ability of boards of directors and corporate officers to manage their 
enterprises.  This new enterprise was not grounded in the same bedrock as the political 
                                            
6 http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1153.htm 
7 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ343.110.pdf 
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enterprises it replaced.  The defining of new entanglement territory was soon evident as 
the means to induce financial stability began to change rapidly in terms of the rhetoric 
and actions of the key political actors involved in its administration.   
The ostensible purpose of the TARP, and the purpose in place when Congress 
approved the initiative, was to buy up so-called “toxic assets,” those assets held by 
banks that were considered worthless due to their basis in the failing mortgage 
derivatives market.  Yet as Congleton (2009) points out, this de jure purpose soon 
became inconsistent with the de facto actions taken by the Treasury Department.  
Instead of immediately purchasing toxic assets (i.e., mortgage-backed securities) as 
approved by Congress, the TARP’s first action was to distribute $250 billion in subsidies 
to nine large banks and financial institutions by purchasing preferred stock and 
warrants.8  The nine-bank “rescue,” which was reluctantly embraced by some, 
unneeded by others, but unavoidably accepted by all formed a family of Big Players 
who would be armed to operate with relaxed bankruptcy constraints. Congressional 
review of the newly invented activity became the subject of yet another hearing where 
Congress called on Secretary Paulson to explain what was taking place.  Without 
apologies, Mr. Paulson indicated that he was doing all in his power to avoid a world 
collapse of financial institutions, and that if necessary he might change his mind again.  
It is critical to our theory that congressional leadership accepted rather quietly Mr. 
Paulson’s declaration of unlimited power to conduct the nation’s business.   Our 
entanglement theory predicts energizing and expanding the arteries that support the 
                                            
8 The represented banks were Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 
JPMorgan Chase & Co., Merrill Lynch & Co., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., State Street Corp., Morgan 
Stanley, and Wells Fargo & Co. 
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flow of politically produced transfers to economic agents already connected to the 
political engine. 
 
4.2: The gears in the TARP transmission 
 It is now necessary for us to analyze this shift in more detail. What were the 
gears in the TARP transmission?  How did Mr. Paulson and other key government 
players fertilize the field for entanglement growth? Recently released government 
documents show that Secretary of Treasury Paulson had a closed meeting with CEOs 
from the nine initial recipients of TARP monies, most of which were financially strong 
and needed no government assistance.9  In this meeting, Paulson all but ensured 
compliance with his plan of purchasing preferred stock by telling them that non-
compliance “would leave you vulnerable and exposed” and further threatening 
regulation.10   
The Treasury soon extended this change in the allocation of the TARP funds 
beyond these initial nine firms.  The Treasury described this new allocation method as 
follows: 
Under the program, Treasury will purchase up to $250 billion of senior preferred 
shares on standardized terms as described in the program's term sheet. The 
program will be available to qualifying U.S. controlled banks, savings 
                                            
9 The only rational explanation that we can offer for the strong-arming of sound financial institutions 
assumes that Secretary of Treasury Paulson and his advisors did not want to identify explicitly the 
weakest large bank in the financial system.  Bank runs were already occurring.  A bank panic could have 
been fomented when the invitation list became public. 
10 This comes from documents that reveal a list of talking points at the Oct. 13th meeting.  The points of 
relevance are: 
 
-  We don’t believe it is tenable to opt out because doing so would leave you vulnerable and 
exposed. 
- If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware that your regulator will require it in 
any circumstance. 
 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/files/documents/2009/Treasury-CEO-TalkingPoints.pdf 
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associations, and certain bank and savings and loan holding companies engaged 
only in financial activities that elect to participate before 5:00 pm (EDT) on 
November 14, 2008. Treasury will determine eligibility and allocations for 
interested parties after consultation with the appropriate federal banking 
agency… 
 
…Companies participating in the program must adopt the Treasury Department's 
standards for executive compensation and corporate governance, for the period 
during which Treasury holds equity issued under this program. These standards 
generally apply to the chief executive officer, chief financial officer, plus the next 
three most highly compensated executive officers.11 
 
 
4.3: How TARP expands entanglement beyond banking 
Our second episode concerns the shifting of the reported objectives of the TARP 
to incorporate other industries, especially the automobile industry.  Here we describe 
how commercial organizations long accustomed to operating in a highly charged 
political economy adapted to the new political landscape by altering the nature of their 
transactions, appealing to newly endowed authorities using other politically expedient 
devices, or both.  We trace the shift in the objectives of the TARP to accommodate 
these various industries starting with its purchase of additional senior stocks in 
American Insurance Group (AIG).  AIG technically was the world’s largest insurance 
company, had invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities and was also the leading 
writer of insurance, termed “credit default swaps,” which protected sub-prime mortgage 
investors from default losses.  AIG was technically bankrupt because of the operating 
losses related to the combination of investments and contracts.   
                                            
11 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm. In addition to this noted activity, the Federal 
Reserve Board dramatically expanded the direct purchase of debt instruments including commercial 
paper from the commercial banking system.  As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet has shown 
unprecedented growth, raising serious concerns as to how the Fed will ultimately “unwind” its some $1 
trillion in newly acquired paper (Hamilton 2009: 67-84).  
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With financial linkages that reached across the entire financial community, the 
government viewed AIG as too big to fail.  This made AIG a Big Player, which is to say 
a firm without a bankruptcy constraint.  As a result, the federal government had already 
become increasingly entangled with AIG, even before the establishment of the TARP.  
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York authorized a two-year loan of up to $85 billion 
for AIG to draw upon following the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the dramatic fall in 
the value of AIG shares on September 16, 2008.12  They extended an additional loan of 
$37.5 billion on October 8.13  On November 10, the Treasury Department assumed 
some of the financial burden by issuing a $40 billion subsidy to purchase senior 
preferred stock.  This allowed the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to reduce its 
previous allocation of $85 billion to $60 billion.   
Given AIG’s status as an insurance company rather than strictly a financial 
institution, it would seem that the TARP monies would not be applicable.  However, in 
its press release the Treasury Department argued that it was necessary “to restructure 
federal assistance to the systemically important company.”  This shift of intended 
recipients of TARP monies from “qualifying U.S. controlled banks, savings associations, 
and certain bank and savings and loan holding companies engaged only in financial 
activities” to those deemed systemically important to the economy opened the door for 
Treasury to define the remaining distribution of TARP monies in any way that might 
satisfy crisis control logic.   
In exchange for this subsidy, the Treasury stipulated the following: 
Under the agreement, AIG must comply with the executive compensation and 
corporate governance requirements of Section 111 of the Emergency Economic 
                                            
12 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20080916a.htm 
13 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20081008a.htm 
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Stabilization Act. AIG must comply with the most stringent limitations on 
executive compensation for its top five senior executive officers as required 
under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. Treasury is also requiring 
golden parachute limitations and a freeze on the size of the annual bonus pool 
for the top 70 company executives. Additionally, AIG must continue to maintain 
and enforce newly adopted restrictions put in place by the new management on 
corporate expenses and lobbying as well as corporate governance requirements, 
including formation of a risk management committee under the board of 
directors.14 
 
This new oversight of executive compensation practices was a characteristic of 
entanglement brought about by this allocation of TARP money.   
 Following this new disbursement practice, three of the largest national insurance 
companies, which were unaccustomed to federal regulation,  took steps to qualify 
themselves as proper recipients of TARP money.  These firms, Lincoln National, 
Hartford Financial Services Group, and Genworth Financial, each acquired federally 
regulated financial institutions to qualify for TARP.  While Genworth was unable to 
secure TARP funding, on May 14, 2009, Lincoln Insurance Company and The Hartford 
both announced preliminary approval for the disbursal of TARP funds.15  These are just 
a few among many other companies such as CIT Group, Inc., GMAC, and IB Finance 
Holding Company, LLC that repositioned themselves in their various market 
characterizations to take advantage of the new political landscape. In most cases, there 
was a linkage to financial markets and investment in sub-prime mortgages, no matter 
how indirect.  In some cases, though, the crisis to be met had more to do with 
countering rising unemployment and regional decline than sub-prime debt.  
 Perhaps the most apparent example of this came with the appeal of General 
Motors, Chrysler, and Ford to Congress for TARP funding.  In testimony before 
                                            
14 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1261.htm 
15 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid=attbD0r7Nr70 
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Congress, the CEOs of these firms argued that a combination of a weak economy, 
constrained credit institutions, and legacy costs associated with the provision of health 
care and retirement benefits to United Auto Worker union members was driving their 
companies into possible insolvency. GM and Chrysler asked for $25 billion in TARP 
money.16  Ford Motor Company was not in such difficult straits; the company asked for 
a line of credit, not a direct injection of TARP money.  Congress rebuffed this initial 
request, though, apparently failing to see how $25 billion alone would save the 
automotive industry. 
 On December 19, 2008, President Bush, through an executive order, broadened 
the domain of TARP monies to include essentially any program deemed necessary to 
avert the financial crisis.  The Bush administration utilized this stunning shift in the 
direction of the TARP to distribute funds to the ailing automotive industry by offering 
$9.4 billion to General Motors and $4 billion to Chrysler.  These disbursements came 
amidst continued warning from both General Motors and Chrysler that all but declared 
pending bankruptcy and bought time for the two companies to operate until the new 
Obama Administration was in office.  The Treasury offered even less in the way of 
justification for this new disbursement practice in the following press statement: 
Treasury will make these loans using authority provided for the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program. While the purpose of this program and the enabling legislation is 
to stabilize our financial sector, the authority allows us to take this action. Absent 
Congressional action, no other authorities existed to stave off a disorderly 
bankruptcy of one or more auto companies.17 
 
As the GM and Chrysler restructuring drew to an end, Senator Mike Johanns (R., 
Neb), without realizing it, described the key difference between an entangled crisis-
                                            
16 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/business/19auto.html?_r=2&em 
17 http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1332.htm 
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driven process and the separated political process that would have taken place normally 
on the political commons: “I never would have believed as a candidate for the U.S. 
Senate that the U.S. government could buy GM without a hearing, with no vote, yes or 
no.  There are billions and billions of dollars at stake here” (Mitchell 2009).  Put 
differently, there was ignorance, rational or otherwise, regarding the total impact of the 
TARP-aided auto deal, but those with the most at stake were obviously well informed.  
 
4.4: Making the transition from crisis to leviathan  
The third period of our study describes how entanglement has spread into other 
features of the regulatory landscape.  In particular, we point to such features as the 
oversight of executive compensation by a White house “Special Master for 
Compensation,” a new and significant entanglement that has little to do with the original 
crisis (Solomon 2009a).  Going beyond the TARP fund recipients, Treasury Secretary 
Geithner pushed for legislative authority to regulate executive pay for all financial 
institutions (Solomon 2009b).  The emerging rules will move this feature of entangled 
regulation to a more stable position on the political commons.  The growing regulation of 
financial institutions makes that sector look more like public utilities than market driven 
corporations subject to some regulatory constraints.  
As executive pay and other constraints began to emerge, early recipients of 
TARP money, wary of continual government oversight, wished to pay back monies 
borrowed from the TARP fund to cut ties with federal overseers.18  According to the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which stipulates the procedure for 
repayment of TARP monies: 
                                            
18 See Smith (working paper) for an in-depth analysis of this withdrawal from TARP. 
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Subject to consultation with the appropriate Federal banking agency (as that term 
is defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), if any, the Secretary 
shall permit a TARP recipient to repay any assistance previously provided under 
the TARP to such financial institution, without regard to whether the financial 
institution has replaced such funds from any other source or to any waiting 
period, and when such assistance is repaid, the Secretary shall liquidate 
warrants associated with such assistance at the current market price. (Division B, 
Title VII, Sec. 7001, SEC 111(g)) 
 
This provision indicates that the repayment of borrowed funds is not subject to scrutiny 
by the Treasury itself.  What is de facto, however, is not de jure. 
This became apparent as frustrated executives found a recalcitrant lender 
waiting.  James Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase claimed on April 17, 2009 in regard 
to repayment of borrowed TARP funds, “We could pay it back tomorrow.  We have the 
money.”19  Likewise Goldman Sachs Group Inc. has stated that its “duty” is to repay 
funds borrowed from the TARP.20  
Yet the Treasury department did not allow immediate payment.  Part of the 
reason here harkens back to the earlier controversy caused by AIG when it announced 
$165 million in bonuses to top executives.  This caused a “populist outrage” and spurred 
political representatives to take action against AIG.  On March 19, 2009, the House 
passed a bill specifically tailored to the AIG incident, which levied a 90% tax on all 
bonuses received by employees making over $250,000 annually and currently 
employed by companies receiving TARP monies.21  The Senate version reduced this 
tax to 70%. 
With the memory of the outrage against AIG fresh on the minds of lawmakers, 
the Treasury Department appointed an overseer to determine optimal compensation 
                                            
19 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123986615199224399.html 
20 http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20090414-708619.html 
21 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/business/20bailout.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp 
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packages for seven of the largest firms receiving TARP funds.22  While Treasury has 
confined this overseer’s area of responsibility thus far to these seven firms, the creation 
of the office alone points to the desire for increased political responsibility within 
previously market-only domains. 
On September 24, 2009, approximately one year after the initiation of the TARP, 
Neil Barofsky, Special Inspector General for the TARP, testified before Congress 
regarding the progress of the initiative.  As of September 11, 2009, the Treasury has 
allowed 41 banks to repay borrowed TARP funds.  These firms were required to pass 
several “stress tests” to qualify for repayment including raising a substantial amount of 
private equity.  Some of the firms are still negotiating the reacquisition of warrants 
extended to the Treasury.  As of June 30, 2009, 649 U.S. banks had received $218 
billion in TARP money and $70 billion has been repaid.  Those still in the fold far exceed 
the number the Treasury has allowed to exit.23 
Our discussion of TARP illustrates how existing linkages between public and 
private economic agents become energized, enlarged, and expanded when the 
economy is hit by a severe economic shock.  Because it is not episodic but rather about 
process, entanglement theory better explains the tightened linkages between 
government and long-connected economic agents relative to competing theories of 
regulation.  Our theory also accounts for new players in an expanded network of 
transfer and control.  To demonstrate that our theory applies beyond the most recent 
crisis, we now illustrate how entanglement can be applied to a historic example of 
                                            
22 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/11pay.html?hp. These firms are American International 
Group, Citigroup, Bank of America, General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler, and Chrysler Financial. 
23 
http://sigtarp.gov/reports/testimony/2009/Testimony_Before_the_Senate_Banking_Committee_on_Bankin
g_Housing_and_Urban_Affairs_%209_24_09_Final.pdf 
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energized government entanglement into the economy:  the New Deal’s National 
Recovery Administration. 
 
5. Historical episode:  The NRA as illuminated by entangled political economy 
Our historical episode of entanglement occurred during the Great Depression.  
We draw parallels in entanglement between these separate episodes to demonstrate 
how unoriginal the TARP really is.  Indeed our analysis calls into question the various 
normative policy suggestions typically offered in times of crisis, which invariably 
advocate yet more entanglement.  Once again, we must 1) explain how an entangled 
field for action is first formed by key political economy players, 2) identify the energized 
linkages that brighten during stressful times to deliver specialized benefits to emerging 
Big Players and related economic agents in the political economy, and then 3) show 
how an entanglement contagion develops that embraces other firms and industries in 
an inspired regulatory process.  We must also brush against the “gears in the 
transmission” that make the transfer mechanism work for key players. 
The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), signed into law by Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt on June 16, 1933, the last of the first 100 days, provides a prime example of 
entanglement.  Of even greater interest to our story, the Supreme Court nullification of 
the NIRA just two years later on May 25, 1935 in Schechter Poultry v. United States 
(295 U.S. 495 (1935)) set in motion legislative action that replaced each critical part of 
the then defunct NIRA. Legislation passed in a matter of months included the Wagner 
Act, which replaced the NIRA’s labor provisions, and the Robinson-Patman Act, which, 
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as an anti-price cutting law, replaced the price codes. This legislative step illustrates the 
ever thickening entanglement among commercial and political enterprises.  
The Great Depression was the crisis trigger. An international financial market 
meltdown followed by Federal Reserve and protectionist action yielded a deep 
economic collapse (Temin 1976).  Out of the ashes came the New Deal and the 1933 
legislation marathon that yielded the NIRA.  There are obvious parallels between the 
TARP story and this one, with the National Industrial Recovery Act corresponding to the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act and the National Recovery Administration (see 
below) corresponding to the TARP itself.  In both cases, a severe credit market shock, 
hurry-up legislation, and special deal making in the executive branch pushed the 
political economy into thickening entanglement.  In this case, as with TARP, major 
industries, firms, and their agents had earlier formed close regulatory relationships with 
government.  As documented by Higgs (1987), entanglement did not start with the New 
Deal, but rather with controls that emerged in World War I.  
In placing his signature on the NIRA, President Roosevelt said (Deering, Homan, 
Lorwin, and Lyon 1934: 1):   
History probably will record the National Industrial Recovery Act as the most 
important and far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress.  It 
represents a supreme effort to stabilize for all time the many factors which make 
for the prosperity and the preservation of American standards.  Its goal is the 
assurance of a reasonable profit to industry and living wages for labor, with the 
elimination of the piratical methods and practices which have not only harassed 
honest business but also contributed to the ills of labor. 
 
The NIRA signing, moreover, was just one in a series of statutes signed in a matter of 
hours.  These included the Glass-Steagall Act, which established new constraints on 
banking and initiated the FDIC, and legislation that reorganized the U.S. railroads (Alter 
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2006: 304-305).  Mr. Roosevelt reserved his most expansive comments for the NIRA 
statute, which he signed last in the series. 
Described by Powell (2003: 113) as “FDR’s biggest bet, his best hope, the 
flagship of the New Deal,” the act gave Mr. Roosevelt almost unlimited power to 
intervene and manage the U.S. economy.  With the signing of the NIRA, the president 
set in force activities that would eliminate child labor, set minimum wages for every U.S. 
industry, but not the same minimum wage, establish the maximum number of hours in 
the work week, require recognition of organized labor in the work place, and establish a 
gigantic bureaucracy for managing the federal cartel that was formed.  In terms of our 
theory, Mr. Roosevelt and his operatives were “grazing” on a policy commons with most 
of the constitutional barbed wire cut and stored away, at least temporarily.  The time 
was ripe to energize existing arteries that connected government and commercial 
agents and to enlarge the network by several orders of magnitude. 
Just as now, there was a growing animus against capitalism and capitalists, 
especially those with high earnings and newly accumulated wealth.  The NIRA drew on 
the model of Mussolini’s fascism, which was popular at the time, and the idea that the 
corporate state could best manage a depression economy.  Many leaders then believed 
that a new age of collective action and national planning had arrived, that free market 
capitalism was a dead letter.24   
In a hearing on the act, Senator Robert F. Wagner, a leading proponent, 
emphasized that the time for planning and rationalization had arrived.  He said  
                                            
24 Higgs (1987: 177) provides comments from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and from Senator James 
F. Byrnes on the end of individualism.  Byrnes said that businessmen were “clamoring for legislation 
providing government controls.” 
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           Competition is not abolished; it is only made rational. In this bill we say that 
business may not compete by reducing wages below the American standard of 
living, by sweating labor, or by resorting to unfair practices.  Competition is 
limited to legitimate and honorable bids in the market and real gains in technical 
efficiency (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin and Lyon 1934: 11).   
 
The NIRA’s preamble addressed the serious emergency faced by the nation, and in a 
first component empowered the president to develop industrial codes, industrial and 
labor coordination, gave the president power to regulate all prices and wages and 
addressed specifically the power of the president to regulate oil prices and pipeline 
operations (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin, and Lyon 1934: 116-124).   
 
5.1: The gears in the NRA transmission 
To provide gears in the transmission that would thicken and expand 
entanglement, the act established a massive bureaucracy charged with the 
responsibility of cartelizing every major sector and component of the U.S. economy, 
with each sector organized under a trade association, and with each industry 
association having a pricing code approved by FDR.  A National Recovery 
Administration (NRA), established by the act and led by General Hugh F. Johnson, a 
retired Army general with considerable experience having been a part of the World War 
I bureaucracy.  He was dedicated to the task, charged with managing and enforcing the 
emerging codes.  By its very nature, the NRA would write and supervise hundreds of 
codes for as many industry sectors (Taylor 2007).  Each sector and each firm in the 
sector would be highly informed about the fine print that governed their relevant sector.  
But it would be an impossible task for the leadership of any sector, firm or industry to 
keep up with the details of all other sectors.  Consistent with the unavoidable division of 
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knowledge, even those closely connected to NRA rules were largely ignorant outside 
their domains of particular expertise.  
Full of enthusiasm for the task that lay before him, General Johnson used all the 
creativity he could muster to rally support for the Blue Eagle, the ubiquitous symbol he 
adopted for the NRA.  He allowed businesses that toed the NRA line to fly the Blue 
Eagle flag and affix the Eagle imprimatur to their packages and include in their 
advertisements, and urged consumers to boycott non-Eagle producers (Higgs 1987: 
179).  
Once the NRA bureaucracy was up and running, there were 54 state and 
regional offices with 1,400 employees nationwide (Taylor 2002: 2).  Approximately 700 
industrial codes were put in place and these dealt with more than 150 trade practices, 
such as advertising, packaging, and product standardization.  Along with codes came 
more than 11,000 administrative orders that affected some 2.3 million employers 
(Powell 2003: 121).  In June 1935, the National Industrial Conference Board, the 
predecessor to today’s Conference Board, reported that the NRA’s two year operating 
cost had totaled $93.8 million, which is equivalent to $1.4 billion in 2009 dollars or 
approximately $700 million per year (Cost of NRA rule put at $93,884,595 1935).  To 
give some perspective to the magnitude of the operation, consider this: the 2010 budget 
for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is $1.02 billion (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Budget in Brief 2009) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s 
2009 budget is $243 million (U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2009, Congressional 
Budget Justification 2009).  Entanglement was being taken to the limit, or so it seemed. 
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As might be expected, leaders of many major American corporations along with 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce strongly supported the NRA.  Indeed, when signed into 
law, the president of the U.S. Chamber referred to the act as the “Magna Charta of 
industry and labor” (Powell 2003: 114).25  Major players wanted to be regulated.  
Another major component of the act focused on labor and labor relations.  The NRA 
effectively required industry to bargain collectively with organized labor and established 
a government mechanism for settling labor disputes.  The NRA codes set minimum 
prices, minimum wages and maximum hours allowed in a workweek, based on a 
misguided theory that higher prices would translate into larger revenues for firms so that 
workers’ take-home pay would increase. 
That some industries were anxious to organize under the Blue Eagle cartel is 
revealed from the fact that the U.S. cotton textile industry had its NRA code written and 
approved by the president on July 9, 1933, less than one month after Mr. Roosevelt 
signed the authorizing legislation (Dearing, Homan, Lorwin and Lyon 1934: 141).  The 
textile code illustrates the entangled fine-tuning accomplished within the context of the 
NRA, which also identifies one of the more interesting gears in the NRA transmission. 
Among other things, the textile code established minimum wages for just that industry 
with a small differential for northern and southern mills, $13 for a 40 hour week in the 
North; $12 in the South (Powell 2003: 121-122).  The wages set were significantly 
higher than those prevailing at the time.  Cotton textile manufacturing was rapidly 
moving South, and organized textile workers in the North used the Blue Eagle 
opportunity to raise wages and close the wage gap.  New England textile mill operators 
                                            
25 The codes and trade association coordination components of the act, known as the Swope Plan, had 
been promoted for several years by Gerard Swope, president of General Electric (Powell 2003: 113). 
Herbert Hoover had rejected the Swope Plan in 1931, calling it and its supporters “sheer fascism.”    
 33
dominated the textile trade association.  The first industry entangled with the Blue Eagle 
was the textile industry. 
 
5.2: Difficulties in building and keeping the cartel 
Just as with Treasury attempts to herd major U.S. banks into a TARP cartel, not 
every firm and industry was cooperative with the Blue Eagle.  Henry Ford refused to 
sign the auto code drafted by General Motors and Chrysler.  Powell (2003: 125-127) 
tells about Ford’s opposition and how, because of this, the NRA threatened him with 
losing a bid to supply trucks to the government, just as Secretary Paulson threatened 
TARP-reluctant bankers with new regulatory initiatives.  Ford was the low bidder and, 
ironically, paid the highest wages in the industry.  While Ford won that bid, shortly 
thereafter Mr. Roosevelt issued an executive order that denied government business to 
any firm that did not fly the Blue Eagle.  Mr. Ford’s sales increased that year without 
government orders. 
Mr. Ford was not the only one to express opposition to the Graphic Arts Code.  
As the NRA expanded its reach with codes and other rules, a growing number of 
‘misfits” began to emerge.  Put another way, the cartel was costly to maintain.  For 
example, in July 1934, in a first united protest against the NRA, a group of Bronx 
printers turned in their Blue Eagles in protest against the Graphic Arts Code that 
included them (70 Bronx printers return Blue Eagle 1934).  The printers had petitioned 
relief from code-set wages.  A representative for the group indicated that the Blue Eagle 
wages were about double those that prevailed before the code was adopted.  
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Expressing support for the NRA concept and not wanting to appear radical, the 
statement went on: 
           It is unfair to expect medium or small-sized shops to pay the same scale of 
wages as the large plants when general conditions such as the amount and type 
of business and volume of production is taken into consideration.  This schedule 
will place an unfair hardship on most of us and force many of us to go out of 
business (70 Bronx printers return Blue Eagle 1934). 
 
Quite possibly, the larger firms in the industry knew exactly what they were doing when 
they contracted for a code that raised competitors’ costs. 
There were also occasions where special deals made by the NRA to some firms 
in an industry, but not to all, led to policy reversals (Cotton pay rise exemptions are 
granted; NRA aids 145 concerns, ten associations 1934).  The growing power of the 
NRA to deal with specific firms as well as entire industries led the agency to use 
withdrawal of the Blue Eagle, a requirement for doing business with government, as the 
ultimate punishment for failure to abide by the codes.  The sanction reached even to the 
level of the producers of dolls’ clothes (NRA may restore a Blue Eagle here 1934).  
Eventually, while addressing such things as the prices of cigarettes, the NRA turned 
attention to Hollywood and began an investigation of movie stars’ salaries (Movie 
salaries listed 1934), perhaps the counterpart to today’s political concern with executive 
pay.  The effort to maintain the Blue Eagle cartels became more troublesome as some 
firms tested the legality of the NIRA’s antitrust exemption as well as its other powers.  
As might be expected, the agency opened a litigation department to handle the growing 
number of lawsuits.  In November 1934, after having been in business just seven 
months, the litigation unit reported that 663 cases had been docketed and that the unit 
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had prevailed in all but 10 of 129 court actions (NRA is winning 90% of its court tests 
1934). 
With a genius for recognizing opposition and neutralizing it, President Roosevelt 
named famous courtroom lawyer Clarence Darrow as head of a committee to review the 
NRA’s operation.  What may not have been expected was Darrow’s fiery assessment 
that accused FDR of having attempted to monopolize markets and General Johnson of 
having made deals to alter codes after FDR had signed a “final” order (Johnson 
accused by Darrow board of altering code 1934).  Custom-tailored entanglement was 
creating problems. 
 
5.3: The end of the Blue Eagle: from crisis to leviathan 
Amity Shlaes (2007) provides an interesting and colorful account of how 
Schechter Brothers Poultry Company, a Brooklyn-based chicken seller, became the 
plaintiff that ultimately brought down the NIRA and all its trappings.  As she might have 
put it, the Schechter Chicken killed the Blue Eagle. A favorable Supreme Court decision 
came in a circuitous fashion.  The Schechter firm was charged with violating the “Code 
of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry in and around the Metropolitan Area in 
and about the City of New York,” an NRA code title that illustrates the specificity of the 
rules.26  The firm was charged and convicted in the New York Federal Court (NRA is 
winning 90% of its court tests 1934).  The brothers appealed the case to the U.S. 
                                            
26 To further illustrate the regulatory detail, under the rule in question “(1) It was required that an 
employee of the seller reach into a crate of chickens and grab out the birds one by one as they came to 
hand; (2) it was required that the buyer accept the chicken thus pulled forth” (End of NRA 1935: B1).  This 
was the so-called “straight killing” rule, which prohibited selecting individual chickens from a crate.  On 
June 20, 1934, a Schechter employee allowed a customer to pick and chose several chickens from a 
crate, rejecting some perfectly healthy chickens in the process.  It was outright chicken discrimination, 
illegal under the code.   
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Supreme Court, which ruled unanimously in their favor by declaring that the NIRA 
unconstitutionally delegated powers to appointed officials to develop laws and 
regulations that carried criminal sanctions.  The Court also ruled that interference in 
business transactions that did not involve interstate commerce represented an unlawful 
expansion of powers for the U.S. government. 
The ruling was devastating to the FDR effort and to those industries that enjoyed 
NRA shelters from free market competition.  If the NIRA was unconstitutional, other 
major statutes inevitably would follow.  Mr. Roosevelt responded by charging that the 
decision took the country back to 1789, in effect saying that the federal government was 
powerless to cope with the problems that came with the country’s economic growth and 
development (End of NRA 1935).  In terms of our model, the Court action brought to an 
end the chaotic activity on the commons.  Without missing a beat, though, Congress 
and Mr. Roosevelt moved quickly to replace key gears in the NIRA transmission with 
newly enacted statutes. 
The Schechter decision was rendered on May 27, 1935.  On July 5, 1935, Mr. 
Roosevelt signed the National Labor Relations Act that effectively embodied the labor 
section of the NIRA.  On June 5, 1935, lawmakers passed the Robinson-Patman Act, a 
statute that outlawed price-cutting.  They passed the Connolly Hot Oil Act earlier, on 
February 22, 1935.  That piece of temporary legislation was then extended to replace 
the NIRA’s petroleum regulations.  When considered in their entirety, the new legislation 
provided uniform wage and hour regulations, guaranteed the right of labor to organize 
with union representation of its choosing, eliminated child labor, cartelized oil 
production, and prohibited price-cutting.  In terms of social structure, the NIRA had 
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established trade associations as a prevalent American institution for lobbying and 
favor-seeking, and the NRA experience made Washington, D.C. the center of the 
nation’s political economy.  Thus, the links between political and commercial agents 
were strengthened; enlarged entanglement became a permanent feature of the modern 
U.S. economy. 
 
6. Some concluding remarks 
As our narrative illustrates, the entanglement of political and commercial 
enterprises typically thickens and expands in times of crisis, and with new degrees of 
entanglement becoming new norms going forward.  What we witness in instances of 
crisis is the variable turbulence that is an operating characteristic of a system of 
entangled political economy.  This perspective is hidden from the framework of 
separated political economy because that framework offers no theoretical space for 
emergent action within the aggregates we denote as polity and economy to transform a 
system of political economy.  Entrepreneurs are always looking for profit opportunities; 
however, periods of crisis perhaps provide particular opportunities for seeking profits 
that generate systemic changes of an emergent nature that have enduring 
consequences, whether for good or bad. 
 For example, in times of stability, the Treasury likely would have used its 
resources as approved by a majority of the legislature in the fashion stipulated by the 
initial measure or would face the consequence of having these discretionary powers 
removed.  Instead, the crisis enabled Mr. Paulson to maneuver far beyond his original 
mandate.  Under the lens of entanglement, this dramatic shift in the direction of the 
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TARP is understandable at least in form.  Mr. Paulson’s enhanced maneuverability 
demonstrates a certain understandable preference from the political side of the 
exchange.  If Paulson had pursued the plan proposed to Congress, he would have 
implemented a reverse auction, which presumably would have resulted in so-called 
toxic assets going off the balance sheets of investment banks and on to the balance 
sheet of the Federal Reserve Board or the U.S. Treasury.  Instead, by buying shares of 
certain financial institutions directly, the Treasury as a political enterprise became 
further entangled in the affairs of market enterprises by becoming essentially a 
shareholder rather than a bondholder.  With ownership rights, Treasury as agent for 
taxpayers and Congress could extend its control by making demands on how TARP-
controlled firms would set loan policies and compensate executives.  Furthermore, this 
enabled further discretion over repayment practices.  
We make similar observations regarding Mr. Roosevelt and the NRA.  Realizing 
that he was skating on thin constitutional ice, Mr. Roosevelt moved ahead anyway with 
one of, if not the most, significant restructurings of the U.S. economy to occur before or 
since.  The Great Depression was the galvanizing event, but not the origin of expanded 
government and commercial entanglement.  At the same time, Mr. Roosevelt and his 
political operatives were prepared for the day when the Court ruled his juggernaut 
unconstitutional.  In a matter of months, key features of the NRA were embodied in 
congressional action.  Key arteries that connect government with major sectors and 
industries were made a permanent part of the landscape. 
This analysis is not meant to suggest that entanglement is initiated only by 
political entrepreneurs.  For market actors are in many cases just as eager to increase 
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their interactions with political enterprises.  Such activity falls under the label of “rent-
seeking” and is an unalterable feature of the political marketplace.  This observation 
calls into question at least one element of the argument that crises are purely a result of 
unrestrained political intervention.  It must be recognized that political action can just as 
easily be initiated from market enterprises as their political counterparts. 
Entanglement there surely always will be, much as Hughes (1977) recognized.  
To some extent, however, the degree and the structure of entanglement can be subject 
to influence.  If we start from an observation of such heart-wrenching financial problems 
as people losing their homes, it is natural to expect some collective version of the 
Samaritan’s Dilemma (Buchanan 1975) to come into play.  That dilemma can also 
operate for private persons, of course, and, indeed, this was Buchanan’s original point.  
But it also intensifies in collective contexts, as Wagner (1989) explained in his extension 
of Buchanan’s original insight, because individual responsibility weakens in collective 
settings, much as Caplan (2007) elaborates.  Constitutional limits on the size of 
government or on the allowable range of its activities might mitigate some of the 
disruptive features of entanglement.  We do not think that such entanglement can be 
eliminated, though, for we see such entanglement rather as an inescapable element of 
the human condition. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors express appreciation to two anonymous referees of this journal for helpful 
comments and criticisms. 
 40
References 
70 Bronx printers return Blue Eagle., 1934. New York Times (1957-Current File, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (July 26): 21. 
 
Alter, J. 2006. The Defining Moment. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Barabási, A-L. 2002. Linked: The New Science of Networks, Cambridge, MA: Perseus. 
 
Besley, T. 2006. Principled Agents? The Political Economy of Good Government. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. 1975. The samaritan’s dilemma. In Altruism, Morality, and Economic 
Theory, Edmund Phelps (ed.). New York: Russell Sage, pp. 71-85. 
 
Caplan, B. 2007.  The Myth of the Rational Voter.  Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press.  
 
Cohan, W. D. 2009. House of Cards, New York: Doubleday Publishing Group. 
 
Congleton, R.D. 2009. On the political economy of the financial crisis and bailout of 
2008. Public Choice 140: 287-317. 
 
Cost of NRA rule put at $93,884,596. 1935. New York Times (1957-Current File, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (June 10): 2. 
 
Cotton pay rise exemptions are granted; NRA aids 145 concerns, ten associations. 
1934. New York Times (1957-Current File, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New 
York Times (1851-2005), (December 10): 2 
 
Dearing, C. L., Homan, P. T., Lorwin, L. L. and Lyon, L. S. 1934. The ABC of the NRA.  
Washington: The Brookings Institution. 
 
End of NRA. 1935. New York Times (1957-Current File, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (June 2): B1. 
 
Eucken, W. 1952 [1990]. Grundsätze der Wirtschaftpolitik 6th ed. Tübingen: J. C. 
B. Mohr.   
 
Goldberg, J. 2008. Liberal Fascism. New York: Random House.  
 
Hamilton, James D. 2009.  Concern about the Fed's new balance sheet, in John D. 
Ciorciari and John B. Taylor, eds. The Road Ahead for the Fed. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press. 68-84. 
 
 41
Hayek, F. A. 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35: 
519-30.  
 
Higgs, R. 1987. Crisis and Leviathan. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hughes, J. R. T. 1977. The Governmental Habit: Economic Controls from Colonial 
Times to the Present. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Ikeda, S. 1997. Dynamics of the Mixed Economy. London: Routledge. 
 
Jacobs, J. 1992. Systems of Survival. New York: Random House. 
 
Johnson accused by darrow board of altering codes. 1934. New York Times (1957-
Current File, ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (June 
12): 1. 
 
Kessler, O. 2009. Towards an economic sociology of the subprime crisis. Economic 
Sociology: the European Electronic Newsletter 10: 11-16. 
 
Koppl, R. 2002. Big Players and the Economic Theory of Expectations. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
 Koppl, R. and Yeager, L. B. 1996. Big players and herding in asset markets. 
Explorations in Economic History 33: 367-83. 
 
Littlechild, S. C. 1978. The Fallacy of the Mixed Economy. London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs. 
 
McChesney, F. 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and 
Political Extortion. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
 
Mitchell, J. 2009.  Car chiefs grilled on dealer closings, The Wall Street Journal, (June 
4): B1. 
 
Morriss, Andrew P., Bruce Yandle, and Andrew Dorchak. 2009.  Regulation by 
Litigation, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Movie salaries listed. 1934. New York Times (1957-Current File, ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (July 8): 8. 
 
NRA is winning 90% of its court tests. 1934. New York Times (1957-Current File, 
ProQuest Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (Nov. 5): 39. 
 
NRA may restore Blue Eagle here. 1934. New York Times (1957-Current File, ProQuest 
Historical Newspapers, The New York Times (1851-2005), (June 30): 4. 
 
 42
Ostrom, E. 1986. An agenda for the study of institutions. Public Choice 48: 3-25. 
 
Ostrom, E. 2005. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Posner, R. A. 2009. A Failure of Capitalism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Potts, J. 2000. The New Evolutionary Microeconomics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
 
Powell, J. 2003.  FDR’s Folly, New York: Crown Forum. 
 
Rowley, C. K. and Smith, N. 2009. Economic Contractions in the United States: A 
Failure of Government. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 
 
Shiller, R. J. 2008.  The Subprime Solution, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Shlaes, A. 2007.  The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression, New 
York: HarperCollins. 
 
Smith, A. Too big to use: conflict and the Troubled Assets Relief Program. George 
Mason University Working Paper. 
 
Smith, A. and Yandle, B. 2009.  Too big to fail, read, count, or stop, Regulation 32(2): 3-
4. 
 
Solomon, D. 2009a. White house set to appoint a pay czar, The Wall Street Journal, 
(June 5): A2. 
 
Solomon, D. 2009b. Salaries safe, bonuses hit, The Wall Street Journal (June 10): A1, 
A4. 
 
Sowell, T. 2009. The Housing Boom and Bust. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Taylor, J. E. 2002.  The output effects of government sponsored cartels during the New 
Deal. Journal of Industrial Economics L: 1-10. 
 
Taylor, J. E. 2007.  Cartel code attributes and cartel performance: an industry level 
analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act. Journal of Law & Economics 50: 597-
624. 
 
Taylor, J. B. 2009.  Getting off Track. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
 43
Temin, P. 1976. Did monetary forces cause the Great Depression. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company.  
 
Tullock, G. 1967. The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Economic Inquiry 5: 
224-32. 
 
Tullock, G. 1975. The transitional gains trap. The Bell Journal of Economics 6(2): 671-
678. 
 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2009, Congressional Budget Justification. 2009. 
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/budgetsummary09.pdf. Visited June 12, 2009.  
 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission  Budget in Brief, 2010. 2009. 
www.sec.gov/about/secfy10congbudgjust.pdf. Visited June 12, 2009. 
 
Wagner, R. E. 1989. To Promote the General Welfare. San Francisco: Pacific Research 
Institute. 
 
Wagner, R. E. 1999. Austrian cycle theory: saving the wheat while discarding the chaff.” 
Review of Austrian Economics 12: 65-80. 
 
Wagner, R. E. 2006. “Choice, catallaxy, and just taxation:  contrasting architectonics for 
fiscal theorizing.”  Social Philosophy and Policy 23: 235-54. 
 
Wagner, R. E. 2007. Fiscal Sociology and the Theory of Public Finance.  Cheltenham, 
UK:  Edward  Elgar. 
 
Wallin, P. 2008. Cause and effect: government policies and the financial crisis. 
Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 
 
White, L. H. 2008.  How did we get into this financial mess? Cato Briefing Paper No. 
110. Washington: Cato Institute, November. 
 
Woods, T. E. Jr. 2009.  Meltdown, Washington, DC: Regnery, Inc. 
 
Yandle, B. 1983.  Bootleggers and baptists: the education of a regulatory economist. 
Regulation  (May/June): 12-16. 
 
Yandle, B. 1984. Intertwined Interests, Rentseeking, and Regulation, Social Science 
Quarterly 65: 1004-1012. 
 
Yandle, B. 2010a.  Lost trust: the real cause of the financial market meltdown, 
Independent Review. 14: 341-361. 
 
Yandle, B. 2010b.  We want to be regulated.  The Freeman 60: 37. 
 
 44
 
  
Figure 1: Separated political economy 
P 
E E* 
 45
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Entangled political economy 
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Figure 3: Forms of exchange relationship in political economy 
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